This essay takes a historical point of view to explain underlying reasons for the unbalanced development between rural and urban areas in China. Moreover, we will provide some policy suggestion given the status quo.
Historical Reasons for the Unusually Large Rural-Urban Divide
The share of total Chinese labor force employed in rural areas was 80% in 1958; twenty years later, in 1978, the number was 76% (China Statistical Yearbook). For an economy with such a large rural population, one would imagine that urbanization should have taken place very quickly assuming low transportation costs. However, labor movements from rural to urban areas during this period were under strict control in China. Beginning in January 1958, the Regulations on Household Registration System in People's Republic of China formally categorized all citizens into those holding "non-agricultural household registrations" and those holding "agricultural household registrations." In addition, the state imposed food supply rationing and food stamps (liangpiao), which were popular in China until 1993. Food and other commodity stamps were distributed to urban residents according to the location of their household registration, family size and other factors. Therefore, it created an effective barrier for labor mobility, especially rural to urban relocation.
Since 1978, the State has loosened restrictions on rural-urban labor movements gradually.
Since 1984, rural individuals who were doing business in urban areas were able to transfer their household registration to corresponding towns and cities, under the constraint that those individuals need to bring their own food rather than receiving food stamps from towns and cities.
In 1985, the Ministry of Public Security approved an annual 0.02% quota of agricultural household registrations switching to non-agricultural ones. In 1993, the food stamps were formally abandoned. The state adopted locations of residence and occupations instead of food stamp rations as the standards to define agricultural and non-agricultural household registration, and began a management system with permanent, temporary and visiting residents. In 1997, the State Counsel passed the new rules allowing rural citizens who were employed in towns, purchased housing in towns, or had immediate relatives in towns to transfer their registration to local townships. More radical changes in the household registration system were discussed in the annual sessions of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held in March 2010.
Due to strict controls on rural-urban labor migration from 1958 to 1978, as soon as the economic reform started in 1978 and the restrictions were loosened, millions of rural Chinese began pouring into towns and cities. In 2009, a conservative estimate for the total number of rural migrants was 180 million, more than 10% of China's population. Most of the rural migrant workers still keep connections with hometowns and go back to visit frequently. Rural migrant workers were given the name "the floating population" because of the high mobility of their jobs.
Characteristics of Rural Migrant Workers
Rural migrant workers are highly concentrated in several provinces in eastern China. In 2004, 28.4% of rural migrant workers worked in Guangdong, 8.1% in Zhejiang, 6.8 % in Jiangsu, 4.7% in Shandong, 4.4% in Shanghai, 4.2% in Fujian, 3 .8% in Beijing, and 3.6% in Hebei. More than one-fourth of rural migrant workers are employed in Guangdong province. Rural migrant workers travel a long distance to find jobs. More than 50% of rural migrants work in places outside their home provinces. Moreover, more than 60% of rural migrant workers are employed in mid-size and large cities and metropolitan areas.
According to the Survey of Rural Migrant Workers in China (2006) , a large proportion of migrant workers are concentrated in labor-intensive sectors. Figure 3 shows that more than 30% of the migrant workers are employed in manufacturing sector, about 23% in construction sector and more than 10% in services. Such sectors have high labor turn-over rates, high risk of jobrelated injuries, and low wages.
There are several reasons for migrant workers' unsatisfactory working conditions. First, there is a large supply of migrant workers which put downward pressure on their wages. At the dawn of the economic reform, about 76% of China's population lived in rural areas.
Metropolitan areas, mid-size cities and towns have developed quickly and attracted a large volume of rural migrant workers over the past three decades. A conservative estimate is that there are 180 million rural migrant workers in China, counting for about 14% of its total population. Nevertheless, 45% of Chinese were living and working in rural areas in 2008, indicating China is still undergoing urbanization process and that there is great potential for the urban labor supply to continue to expand.
Second, migrant workers face low job security when local reinforcement of the Labor Law is weak, in which case, the employers may take advantage of the fact that rural migrant workers do not have local household registration. The Survey of Rural Migrant Workers in China (2006) shows that it is very common for urban employers to exploit wages of rural migrant workers. In 2004, 6.1% of rural migrant workers did not receive their deserved wages.
34% of rural migrant workers did not sign any contract. Many employers withhold 20~30% of wages for three years, which are non-refundable if there are any errors or mistakes in their work or if migrant workers leave the company. Moreover, employers do not purchase health insurance for rural migrant workers, which leave 88.5% of migrant workers uninsured.
Last but not least, the education quality and human capital accumulation in rural China are disturbing. Among rural migrant workers in 2004, 2% are illiterate, 16.4% had primary school education, 65.5% had middle school education, 11.5% had gone to high school, and 4.6% had vocational school education. Most rural migrants have not received any kind of skill training. Even though the average education level of migrant workers are higher than those who choose to stay in rural areas, the overall skills and human capital level of rural migrant workers are not very satisfactory. In 2008, rural individuals on average received 7.8 years of education, urban individuals received 11 years, and Shanghai residents receive 14 years.
The above mentioned three factors-a large labor supply, inadequate protection for rural migrant workers' rights and disadvantages in education result in the deemed low wage level, and insufficient wage bargaining power of migrant workers. It is commonly observed that rural migrant workers receive the minimum wage of the city where they are employed at. Figure 4 shows the levels and growths of minimum wage over the past 15 years in Shenzhen-one of the biggest China's manufacturing and exporting hubs. In nominal terms, the minimum wage in Shenzhen in 2008 was about three times that in 1994. However, after adjustment for inflation, the minimum wage in Shenzhen grew at only four percent per year.
Alternative Occupational Choices for Rural Chinese
Rural migrant workers face low and slowly growing wages, discriminations from urban residents, job insecurity, and high risks in job-related injuries. Far away from families and friends, rural migrant workers have few choices but labor-intensive jobs. One might wonder why millions of rural people still choose to leave their hometown given the seemingly unbearable working conditions?
To answer this question, we need to explore the alternative routes available for rural Chinese other than migration. Generally speaking, there are two broad categories of work that rural individuals can choose from. First, they can engage in agricultural production, such as farming, husbandry, fishing, forestry, etc. Second, they can stay in rural areas and begin nonfarm businesses. However, rural individuals encounter sizeable difficulties and barriers in both types of work. As of November 2005, China had approximately 122 million hectares of arable land, covering only 13 percent of its territory. This amounted to 0.27 hectares per capita, oneeighth the U.S. level, and one-half the Indian level. The low quantity of arable land operated by each household makes agricultural production less efficient and makes it difficult to utilize economies of scale. Therefore, agricultural production cannot provide a fast growing income for most rural households.
On the other hand, for those who want to start business in rural non-farm sectors, they frequently suffer from funding shortage problems. Figure 5 shows that the development of TVEs came to a halt after 1990s. Even though the non-farm sector experienced fast growth in rural China after the reform, the rural financial market failed to show the same pace of development.
Since 1980s, there have been several government attempts to liberalize the financial system in rural China; however, the results have not met the expectations. The financial markets in the rural area largely differ from those in the urban area. While the latter have had modernization and even participated in global competition, the former are stagnant. Cheng (2003) and Guo (2009) both show the rural credit markets are fragmented so that formal credit programs are highly centralized, "cheap" credits are earmarked to certain agricultural investment, and private lending is strictly regulated and usually illegal. Deposits in rural China have been increasing over the past two decades; however, loans in those areas have not shown the similar growth. Figure 6 illustrates the decline in the ratio of total rural loans to deposits from 1985 to 2004, which indicates that the rural loanable funds are either channeled outside of rural China or are left unused. Successful entrepreneurship calls for mature financial markets. Facing borrowing constraints, many potential entrepreneurial projects in rural areas rely heavily on self owned funds or borrowing from relatives and friends. Huang (2008) considers the "great reverse" in China's financial policies during 1990s has led to the sluggish development of rural enterprises. Liu (2010) discusses the negative effect of credit constraints on the sizes of rural firms and employment levels, and shows that some migrants choose migration as an intermediate method to accumulate funding for their business projects. The non-profitability in agricultural production due to limited per-capita arable land and the funding shortages facing rural non-farm enterprises have driven many rural people to become migrant workers.
Policy Suggestions
The current large volume of rural migrant workers is not a pure labor phenomenon; but rather, it reflects compounding effects of multiple policies from as early as the 1950s. The agriculture and non-agriculture dual household registration system delayed rural to urban labor movements; however, it also amplified its impact when the restrictions were loosened. The bias of financial policies toward urban sectors jeopardized rural township and village enterprises and brought their development to a halt after 1995. Insufficient education support fails to equip the rural young knowledge and skills that will empower them more leeway in occupational choices.
Under the current economic and political situation, several policies are important for China's further urbanization process.
First, government should strengthen funding for rural education, cutting or eliminating education fees. Even though education is currently free for many rural schools, rural teenagers drop out of middle schools and start working as the opportunity cost of receiving longer education is too high. In order to provide more incentives for the rural young to stay in schools, the government needs to create more jobs requiring skills and higher education level so that students will recognize the long-run value of education. In addition, students from low-income families should have more access to loans to help them finish academic work.
Second, rural enterprises should be granted more access to loans in order to get over the credit constraints. Even though the applications for loans have been becoming much easier than in the 1990s, it is still very difficult for many rural households to obtain loans to start own business. The government should lead more balanced financial and credit policies to guarantee sufficient credit flows in rural areas.
Third, the household registration system should be completely eliminated. As long as there are different types of household registration, class discrimination and resentment will never come to an end, and rural migrant workers will always be in a passive position to accept the minimum wage.
Fourth, the government should speed up the development of suburban areas. Currently, too much monetary and physical resource is invested in the few metropolitan areas, where the large labor supply and fierce competition have suppressed both wages and career development for rural migrant workers. A more balanced development of suburban areas can ease some population density pressure for central cities, and also alleviate regional inequality problem. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 In this context, the title of our symposium, "Chinese Workers Under Threat or Threat to U.S. Workers?" presents (perhaps intentionally) a "false dichotomy." In fact, the fundamental "problem" of China's labor policy is most commonly encapsulated by the famous "race to the bottom," where artificially low wages and weak enforcement of labor and employment laws depress labor costs in China and other global low-wage manufacturing hubs. The result is an "uneven playing field" for American companies and American workers. 2 Evaluating the merits of this claim is beyond the scope of this essay.
However, if we assume this is so, then stronger rights and protections for Chinese In contrast to earlier legislation, these laws limit employer's flexibility in structuring the terms of the labor relationship and adopt a more strongly pro-worker stance. Indeed, a number of the elements of the new legislation (as well as the prior law) bear a strong resemblance to employment laws in France and Germany, which are much more protective of workers than is U.S. employment law (Ho, 2009; Blanpain, 2007) .
While many in the international business community were disappointed by the restrictive nature of some of the new rules, others expressed hope that they would be enforced in practice in a way that would hold Chinese employers to the same standards as U.S. and other multinational employers. Labor advocates, for their part, voiced hopes that the changes would in fact empower China's workers and lead to improved employment practices and expanded space for worker representation (Gallagher & Dong, 2010) .
3 In China, "labor law" encompasses matters generally viewed to be within the scope of "employment law" in the United States and in fact covers to a much more limited extent rules governing collective bargaining and labor-management relations and others, such as freedom of association, are largely excluded. For complete references to the legislation, see Ho (2009) , p. 38.
The Implementation Question
The fundamental question, however, is, is labor reform working? In a study recently published in the Columbia Journal of Asian Law, I present a preliminary answer based on interview and survey data collected from workers, employers, and labor enforcement officials in Guangdong province during the first half of 2008, in the window of time immediately after China's new labor laws took effect but before the full impact of the global financial crisis began to be felt in China (Ho, 2009 ). I focused primarily on the implementation of the basic requirement that all employers enter into written employment contracts with their employees. This obligation was included in China's first national Labor Law, enacted in 1994, but is reinforced in the LCL. Such contracts are typically individual employment contracts, although by official counts, over 60% of China's workers are employed under collective contracts entered into between the local or industry union association and representatives of the employer or an employer association (Clarke et al. 2004; CLB, 2007) .
Executive Summary of Research Findings
In general, the results of this investigation call into question the perception that labor law in China is ineffective and that China's workers are ignorant of or incapable of using legal tools to assert their rights. Instead, this study finds that the law has incentivized shifts in hiring patterns and formal changes in employers' labor contracting practices, although it has had only a limited effect in foreclosing avenues for evasion and noncompliance. The results also paint a more nuanced picture of the obstacles to stronger enforcement at the local level, many of which have parallels in the experience of administrative enforcement agencies in the United States and in other developed economies.
As noted below and in Zhang Lu's contribution elsewhere in this report, the laws were widely disseminated and had an almost immediate impact on the level of labor disputes channeled through labor arbitration and the courts. The explosion of such cases demonstrates that labor conflict in China has actually intensified since the reforms took
effect. Yet it in some measure also reflects the success of the reforms, particularly the procedural reforms under the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, which reduced barriers to "private enforcement" of the labor laws directly by Chinese workers. reported that 97% of all employers had signed written contracts, with over 53,000 collective contracts covering almost 7 million workers also concluded (Ho 2009 ).
Independent interview and survey sources in large part support these results (Ho, 2009 ).
However, a deeper look reveals that many employers were in fact engaging in illegal coercive and deceptive practices to compel workers to sign contracts, which ultimately could make resolving any dispute over the agreement more contentious (Ho, 2009) contracts and over 60% of workers in a separate survey were under short-term contracts of less than 1 year (Ho 2009, p. 92) . 4 In addition, the surveys found that many employers have begun to rely more extensively on probationary, or seconded workers (sourced through labor dispatch (laowu paiqian)) that give employers greater flexibility at lower cost but are afforded fewer protections under the labor laws.
Finally, the study showed that enforcement practices surrounding labor rights in
China are more complex than is commonly recognized. It is significant that national leaders as well as provincial authorities in Guangdong province and elsewhere continued to voice strong commitment to implement the new laws throughout 2008 and 2009 in the face of widespread business failure and worker unrest in the wake of the financial crisis, despite calls for the repeal of the Labor Contract Law from strong business interests and some local government leaders. In Guangdong, this was due in part to the province's policy drive to attract value-added manufacturing and move away from labor-intensive sweatshop production, which aligned its leaders behind the reforms.
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Local officials interviewed in this study, for their part, acknowledged the need to uphold the law but were hesitant to enforce the law aggressively, citing the need for companies to adapt to the new rules. While some may simply turn a blind eye, the reality is that most local enforcement officials in fact lack the resources to enforce the law aggressively. Many were effectively limited to damage control and unable to do so when more businesses began to fail toward the end of 2008 and into 2009, leaving local governments holding the bag for unpaid wages (Canaves, 2009; Roberts, 2009; IHLO, 2009 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
For China's workers, then, this study shows that the new laws have in fact empowered workers, but that many remain "under threat," including those without full employee status under Chinese labor law. Until a "culture of legality" becomes part of China's business environment, this is likely to remain the case even as demand for skilled labor, inter-regional competition, and local development priorities lead to higher minimum wage levels and better workplace practices for some.
Many U.S. employers in China also now confront a more challenging compliance mandate since the passage of the labor law reforms. In general, the LCL has introduced heightened severance obligations and less flexibility in hiring and firing. In addition, employers must address the uncertainty re-introduced by a wide range of new local implementing regulations and the heightened risk of labor-related legal claims that may in some cases be frivolous. 7 There is also little evidence that the reforms have in fact "leveled the playing field" -that is, that official oversight of companies' compliance is directed at domestically-owned companies with the same rigor applied to Western investors.
At the end of last year, the Obama Administration reiterated its interest in engaging
Chinese officials on fundamental labor rights, enforcement of China's labor laws and other key labor-related issues (USTR, 2009). As the scope of that engagement takes shape, U.S. policymakers may consider the following recommendations that flow from the findings reported here:
Support Greater Public Enforcement Capacity:
There is no easy fix to the enforcement problem, as local capacity constraints and economic conditions continue to influence enforcement priorities. However, pressure from U.S. policymakers can serve as one of the multiple, mutually reinforcing mechanisms needed to foster an "environment 7 Under prior law, local arbitration commissions and courts were permitted to charge fees for filing and processing labor claims. Such fees were eliminated by the enactment of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law in an effort to expand access to legal process.
of legality":
 Continue to actively enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FPCA) and collaborate with China and with other global leaders on anti-corruption initiatives.  Continue to fund and support technical exchanges by OSHA, the DOL, and state-level authorities to train Chinese enforcement officials and related experts at all levels.  Provide regular forums for dialogue between U.S. and Chinese enforcement officials on common enforcement challenges, such as capacity constraints and strategies for approaching compliance by small and mid-size employers.  Encourage efforts by Chinese authorities, such as those in Guangzhou (Ho, 2009, pp. 53-54) , to reward companies with strong compliance records, and incentivize employer self-regulation. The U.S. government can work within the WTO and through bilateral efforts to ensure that such programs comply with China's international commitments on transparency and national treatment.  Consider proposals to create consistent approaches to incorporate labor rights provisions within trade and investment agreements, including the proposed Sino-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). 
Support the Accessibility and Transparency of China's Courts and Labor

Arbitration Institutions:
 Urge China to improve the transparency of labor arbitration and court proceedings, and to expand public access to labor law cases and legal aid.
 Urge China to permit the unfettered operation of local NGOs engaged in labor advocacy and to repeal recent measures limiting the freedom of lawyers and other rights advocates to represent clients in "sensitive" cases.
Support U.S. Employers and Civil Society Initiatives
 Encourage U.S. employers to abide by China's labor laws.
 Sponsor business-to-business exchanges focused on human resource 9 See, for example, the recommendations put forth in Aaronson & Rioux (2008) . management, business ethics, compliance, and risk mitigation.
 Support efforts by U.S. nonprofits, academic institutions, and the private sector to encourage grassroots labor advocacy organizations and the expansion of legal aid services in China. The 2008 labor law reforms were enacted into a business climate where compliance has been the exception rather than the rule, and their potential to take root was threatened almost immediately by the onset of the financial crisis. As markets begin to recover, it is imperative that U.S. policymakers actively urge China's leaders at all levels to demonstrate their commitment to consistently enforce the labor laws and assist them in confronting the practical barriers to its implementation. To put the current labor law reform in China in a perspective, let's start from a brief overview of the evolving change of state-labor relations and labor policy and legislation in reform China.
Worker Representation
Between Security and Flexibility: Evolving State-Labor Relations in Reform China
Over the past three decades, China's transition from state socialism to a market economy, along with its integration to the global economy, has changed its state-labor relations profoundly. In the pre-reform era, labor system were known as the "iron rice bowl" system, workers were allocated to a job tenure system in urban work units called "danwei." Their livelihood were guaranteed and enforced by the state provided employment, wages, and welfare distributed through their danwei. In exchange, workers gave their political support and loyalty to the party-state. This is known as the socialist social contract. China's market economic reform in the urban area since early 1980s has changed the state-labor relationship dramatically. Three turning points can be identified.
The first turning point was in 1986, when the State Council issued four sets of provisional regulations on labor and employment reforms and introduced the labor contract system to all new hires at state-owned enterprises (Ngok 2008 ). Yet it was still rare for state-owned enterprises to fire workers until the early 1990s, largely due to workers' resistance to "the smashing of 'iron rice bowl'" permanent employment, and the sensitivity of commodification of labor when the socialist ideology was still relatively strong (Gallagher 2005 , Lee 2007 ).
The second turning point came with the passage of China's first national Labor Law in 1994, which universalized the labor contract system and allowed employers to formally terminate labor contracts with employees. As the state withdrew from direct management of labor, law has become the key institution to regulate labor relations and provide workers with basic rights and protections. This time period was also the era when China deepened the market economic reform and began restructuring and privatizing the state-owned enterprises.
Thousands of small and median state and collective enterprises were restructured and privatized. Over fifty million workers and about 40 percent of the public-enterprise workforce lost their jobs. Meanwhile, with the massive movement of global capital into China, more than 200 million rural migrant workers left countryside for factory jobs in industrial cities.
As marketization and commodification of labor deepened in the 1990s, both the state and employers attempted to shed their previous responsibilities for workers. There was a general move toward more labor flexibility by replacing permanent and long-term employees with temporary and short-term contract workers. A good illustration was the fast expansion of informal employment, in particular, labor dispatch (agency employment) in almost every sector in China. Local Governments: Not surprisingly, the implementation of the new labor laws is bound to be uneven and varied largely by local governments. In particular, coinciding with the global economic downturn meant less local government support for legislation that may hinder economic growth and employment in their areas. Some local governments in coastal manufacturing centers have already taken their own regulatory measures that aim to dilute the law's impact on their local economies. But that does not mean that local officials can completely ignore workers' grievances and discontents, nor does that mean the Chinese central government has lost control over localities. Studies have found that the CCP is still capable in monitoring local officials through the cadre evaluation and promotion system (See, e.g., Landry 2008 , Zeng 2007 . Under the Hu-Wen administration, local officials are given environmental and other social targets (e.g., the numbers of mass incidents) besides GDP in the cadre evaluation system in the effort to create a "harmonious society" (Wang 2008) . As a result, it has been noticed that local officials have taken a more conciliatory attitude towards labor and other social protestors so long as they do not "cross the line" (i.e., aiming to challenge the current political system). For instance, in a recent report on workers' movement in China, China Labor Bulletin observes that concerned with political order and social stability, local government officials often gave protesters a prompt hearing and settled some of their grievances quickly. In cases of unrest triggered by wage arrears following the disappearance of employers, local governments usually stepped in and paid at least some of the wages owed by the absconding employers to pacify workers (CLB 2009b) . Even when some local governments have eased enforcement of the new labor laws by the excuse of global economic downturn,
given the center's emphasis on social harmony and stability, when caught between the conflicting interests of employers and workers they will choose social harmony, i.e. the protection of workers (Heerden 2009) .
ACFTU: Notably, ACFTU played an important role in pushing through the labor law reform as a conveyor-belt to channel the bottom-up pressure of labor unrest to the CCP's top leaders. It has also stayed assertive throughout the law-making process and the implementation of the new labor laws, even under employers' and local officials' backlash attacks and lobbying against the new laws under the global economic crisis. More recent studies have also shown that the fast growing numbers of labor disputes and workers' spontaneous strikes and protests have played a key role in pushing the party-run ACFTU to become more aggressive in organizing rank and files and protecting workers' interests (Chan 2006 , Liu 2008 . In particular, faced with mounting labor unrest, CCP's top leadership has explicitly required unions to play an important role in "harmonizing labor relations" and "building a harmonious society" in recent years. 2 We can expect ACFTU to become more aggressive in organizing workers and reforming itself, under the pressure that it might become totally irrelevant to both workers and state bureaucrats if it cannot deliver any meaningful gains for workers, and (thus) cannot play any role in containing rising labor unrest. Indeed, some have noted that the current crisis presented a more intense version of the long-standing debate within China about the right and power of Chinese workers as both laborers and consumers. While there are voices from employers and local officials calling for repeal of the 2008 labor laws, there are also increasingly labor advocates inside China-from top government and ACFTU officials to journalists, lawyers, and public media--arguing that workers need rights, voice and enhanced purchasing power if China is to transform its export-led growth model to a more socially sustainable development model (Brown 2009 , GLS 2008 . This has important implications for international and US labor and nongovernment organizations to develop strategies to engage with ACFTU and labor and legal aid NGOs in China to bring about more positive change, such as collective bargaining and workers' representation. First, obviously, China is not the only country to which American workers are losing jobs. India, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and many other low-cost countries are involved as well.
Chinese workers are not the enemy of American workers; rather, it is transnational corporations who lay off American workers only to depend on the sweatshop labor in China,
Vietnam, and other low-cost countries the main cause of the problem to blame. Second, as many have noted, it is not only about cheap Chinese labor; rather, economies of agglomeration provided by planned industrial districts and networks, a healthy, educated, and disciplined workforce, and the size of the internal market are all strong motivations for investment in China that would remain even if labor costs rise substantially. If anything, rising real wages will make China even more attractive as a site of investment as the relative global weight of the Chinese market increases further. Third, as many studies have suggested, the decline of organized labor and the loss of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. preceded the rise of competition from China. Other forces, such as the post-industrial economic structural shifts, technology innovation, post-Fordist lean production, change composition of workforce, as well as the "neoliberal turn" of pro-business and pro-free-trade policies are all at work leading to the "crisis of labor movement" in the U.S. and around the globe (Silver 2003 , Moody 2007 . Ruth Milkman (2006) also found that the sweatshop conditions emerged in service sectors such as trucking and janitorial services that are not subject to international competitive pressures. In the other words, the problems faced with American workers-the loss of manufacturing jobs, declines of labor standards and job insecurity, and lack of workers' voice and purchasing power in the United States-were not mainly caused by the competition from Chinese workers. Rather, it is the neoliberal policies of deregulation and unbalanced growth of big corporate power vs. small business and ordinary working family in the U.S. the root of the problems. This crisis has indeed exposed the unsustainability and vulnerability of relying on the economic development models that depend upon evasion of labor standards and norms, and that leave working citizens without channels to effectively redress basic workplace injustices or sufficient purchasing power to afford a decent life for themselves and their families-both in China and in the United States.
Rising labor costs in China will have direct impact on workers as consumers outside of China as the foundations of the low-road neoliberal "social compact" pioneered by the United States (and exported elsewhere) has begun to crumble in this crisis. For to the extent that the suppression of real wages in the United States has been socially sustainable, it has been founded on the massive importation of low-cost consumer items from China as well as on a mushrooming current account deficit. While the crumbling of this race-to-the-bottom neoliberal "social compact" is no doubt a good thing for workers around the world, labor academics and activists have not yet begun to think through the political dynamics, much less strategies and overall vision adequate to confronting the emergent new era. (Silver and Zhang 2009) An important place to start is to change the current discourse of "China threat" and protectionism, and "assist Chinese worker rights advocates in unions, law faculties, NGOs and legal aid societies to take up the invitation presented by 2008 labor law reforms to implement the mandate for collective bargaining" (Brown 2009 ). At the same time, it is also important to keep in mind that national context and historical legacy of state institutions matter. We should not assume that the organizing strategies, patterns, rhetoric, and dynamics at work for labor movement and the general improvement of workers' welfare in China are the same as the conventional wisdoms generated from the experiences of the industrialized and democratic countries. As Earl Brown (2009) , Director of the Solidarity Center at AFL-CIO wisely pointed out, "Our assistance should be delivered with deference to the agency of our Chinese colleagues, and with complete awareness that only the Chinese will determine the contours of their labor relations system."
This global economic crisis has exposed Chinese and American workers, and workers everywhere, to the "dire effects of the unregulated race to the bottom." It is time to make the serious efforts to build a strong labor movement in the U.S. that sees Chinese workers as compatriots, rather than as enemies. Engagement and collaboration is a more effective and smarter strategy than alienation and protectionism to both Chinese and American workers.
